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compare scheme in redirect same-authority check #848
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A scheme change makes the origins different, but does not by itself require rejecting the redirect.
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agreed, and that's the intent here. the scheme mismatch only marks the origins as different, it doesn't reject the redirect on its own. an https to http hop still goes through unless there's an authorization or cookie header to protect, exactly as it already behaves for a differing host or port. the last assertion in the added test covers the plain https to http redirect staying allowed.
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Fair enough. Still, this changes the boundary from authority to origin and extends the existing rejection policy to scheme changes. That needs a clear rationale
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@dxbjavid Why should scheme even matter, given the strategy takes the port into account? Can there realistically be multiple protocol schemes on the same port?
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in practice you're right that a port is normally bound to a single listener, so the same host and port serving both schemes at once is unusual. the concern isn't that the server offers both though, it's that the redirect names the next hop as cleartext: on https://host:8443 to http://host:8443 the client opens a plaintext connection and writes the authorization and cookie headers before any tls, so credentials tied to the secure origin go out in the clear. host and port alone can't tell us that, the scheme can. that's also the rationale for the origin framing (scheme, host, port per rfc 6454) rather than authority, since forwarding those headers is really an origin decision. it doesn't reject the redirect, only strips the sensitive headers, the same as a differing host or port already does.