[pull] master from Comfy-Org:master

app/assets/api/routes.py

@@ -306,12 +306,15 @@ async def download_asset_content(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
             404, "FILE_NOT_FOUND", "Underlying file not found on disk."
         )
 
-    _DANGEROUS_MIME_TYPES = {
-        "text/html", "text/html-sandboxed", "application/xhtml+xml",
-        "text/javascript", "text/css",
-    }
-    if content_type in _DANGEROUS_MIME_TYPES:
+    # User-controlled asset content must never render inline in the app origin
+    # (stored XSS via SVG/HTML/XML). Force dangerous types to download and
+    # override any requested inline disposition. Centralised through
+    # folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type so this can't drift from /view and
+    # /userdata (the previous inline set here omitted image/svg+xml and missed
+    # the charset/casing/+xml-dialect bypasses).
+    if folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type(content_type):
         content_type = "application/octet-stream"
+        disposition = "attachment"
 
     safe_name = (filename or "").replace("\r", "").replace("\n", "")
     encoded = urllib.parse.quote(safe_name)

app/model_manager.py

@@ -50,21 +50,45 @@ async def get_all_models(request):
         @routes.get("/experiment/models/preview/{folder}/{path_index}/{filename:.*}")
         async def get_model_preview(request):
             folder_name = request.match_info.get("folder", None)
-            path_index = int(request.match_info.get("path_index", None))
             filename = request.match_info.get("filename", None)
 
             if folder_name not in folder_paths.folder_names_and_paths:
                 return web.Response(status=404)
 
+            # The "{filename:.*}" capture also matches the empty string, which
+            # would resolve to the folder itself; reject it explicitly.
+            if not filename:
+                return web.Response(status=400)
+
+            try:
+                path_index = int(request.match_info.get("path_index", None))
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                return web.Response(status=400)
+
             folders = folder_paths.folder_names_and_paths[folder_name]
+            if path_index < 0 or path_index >= len(folders[0]):
+                return web.Response(status=404)
             folder = folders[0][path_index]
-            full_filename = os.path.join(folder, filename)
+            full_filename = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(folder, filename))
+
+            # Prevent path traversal: the requested file must stay within the
+            # configured model folder. `filename` is an unrestricted ".*" capture,
+            # so values like "../../../../etc/passwd" would otherwise escape it.
+            if not folder_paths.is_within_directory(folder, full_filename):
+                return web.Response(status=403)
 
             previews = self.get_model_previews(full_filename)
             default_preview = previews[0] if len(previews) > 0 else None
             if default_preview is None or (isinstance(default_preview, str) and not os.path.isfile(default_preview)):
                 return web.Response(status=404)
 
+            # The preview is selected by a glob inside get_model_previews, so a
+            # companion file (e.g. "model.preview.png") could itself be a symlink
+            # resolving outside the model folder. Re-validate the file actually
+            # opened: is_within_directory realpaths it, catching symlink escape.
+            if isinstance(default_preview, str) and not folder_paths.is_within_directory(folder, default_preview):
+                return web.Response(status=403)
+
             try:
                 with Image.open(default_preview) as img:
                     img_bytes = BytesIO()

app/user_manager.py

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 import shutil
 import logging
 import tempfile
+import mimetypes
 from aiohttp import web
 from urllib import parse
 from comfy.cli_args import args
@@ -336,7 +337,20 @@ async def getuserdata(request):
             if not isinstance(path, str):
                 return path
 
-            return web.FileResponse(path)
+            # User data files are arbitrary user-supplied content and are never
+            # meant to render inline. Disable MIME sniffing and force a download
+            # so uploaded markup/scripts can't execute in the app origin (stored
+            # XSS). Content-Disposition: attachment is the load-bearing guard;
+            # the content-type override and nosniff are defence in depth.
+            content_type = mimetypes.guess_type(path)[0] or 'application/octet-stream'
+            if folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type(content_type):
+                content_type = 'application/octet-stream'
+
+            return web.FileResponse(path, headers={
+                "Content-Type": content_type,
+                "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+                "Content-Disposition": "attachment",
+            })
 
         @routes.post("/userdata/{file}")
         async def post_userdata(request):

folder_paths.py

@@ -264,6 +264,59 @@ def annotated_filepath(name: str) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
     return name, base_dir
 
 
+# Content types a browser may execute or render inline. File endpoints that
+# serve user-controlled content must force these to download (and ideally set
+# Content-Disposition: attachment) to avoid stored XSS. Centralised here so the
+# /view and /userdata handlers can't drift apart. mimetypes.guess_type may
+# return either the text/* or application/* spelling depending on platform, so
+# both are listed.
+DANGEROUS_CONTENT_TYPES = {
+    'text/html', 'text/html-sandboxed', 'application/xhtml+xml',
+    'text/javascript', 'application/javascript', 'application/x-javascript',
+    'application/ecmascript', 'text/css',
+    'image/svg+xml', 'application/xml', 'text/xml',
+    # message/rfc822 (.mht/.mhtml) can carry script in some browsers.
+    'message/rfc822',
+}
+
+
+def is_dangerous_content_type(content_type: str | None) -> bool:
+    """Return True if a browser may execute or render `content_type` inline.
+
+    Normalises before matching so the check can't be slipped past with a
+    charset/boundary parameter (``text/html; charset=utf-8``) or casing
+    (``TEXT/HTML``). Any XML dialect (``*+xml`` or ``*/xml``) is treated as
+    dangerous because XML can carry inline script via stylesheet/entity tricks,
+    which also covers the ``application/{xslt,rss,atom,rdf}+xml`` family without
+    enumerating each one. Endpoints serving user-controlled content should route
+    a dangerous type to ``application/octet-stream`` + ``Content-Disposition:
+    attachment`` + ``X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff``.
+    """
+    if not content_type:
+        return False
+    normalized = content_type.split(';', 1)[0].strip().lower()
+    if normalized in DANGEROUS_CONTENT_TYPES:
+        return True
+    return normalized.endswith('+xml') or normalized.endswith('/xml')
+
+
+def is_within_directory(directory: str, target: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True if `target` resolves to a path inside `directory`.
+
+    Uses realpath on both operands so that a symlink placed inside `directory`
+    that points elsewhere cannot escape the containment check at open time.
+    """
+    try:
+        directory = os.path.realpath(directory)
+        target = os.path.realpath(target)
+        return os.path.commonpath((directory, target)) == directory
+    except ValueError:
+        # ValueError is raised by realpath() on a path with an embedded null
+        # byte, and by commonpath() on Windows when the paths are on different
+        # drives. In either case the target is not safely within the directory.
+        return False
+
+
 def get_annotated_filepath(name: str, default_dir: str | None=None) -> str:
     name, base_dir = annotated_filepath(name)
 
@@ -273,7 +326,12 @@ def get_annotated_filepath(name: str, default_dir: str | None=None) -> str:
         else:
             base_dir = get_input_directory()  # fallback path
 
-    return os.path.join(base_dir, name)
+    filepath = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(base_dir, name))
+    # Prevent path traversal: the resolved path must stay within base_dir.
+    # repr() the name in the message so a crafted value can't inject log lines.
+    if not is_within_directory(base_dir, filepath):
+        raise ValueError("Invalid file path: {!r}".format(name))
+    return filepath
 
 
 def exists_annotated_filepath(name) -> bool:
@@ -282,7 +340,10 @@ def exists_annotated_filepath(name) -> bool:
     if base_dir is None:
         base_dir = get_input_directory()  # fallback path
 
-    filepath = os.path.join(base_dir, name)
+    filepath = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(base_dir, name))
+    # Treat traversal attempts as non-existent rather than probing the filesystem.
+    if not is_within_directory(base_dir, filepath):
+        return False
     return os.path.exists(filepath)
 
 

server.py

@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ async def cors_middleware(request: web.Request, handler):
 
     return cors_middleware
 
+
 def is_loopback(host):
     if host is None:
         return False
@@ -616,15 +617,30 @@ async def view_image(request):
                             or 'application/octet-stream'
                         )
 
-                        # For security, force certain mimetypes to download instead of display
-                        if content_type in {'text/html', 'text/html-sandboxed', 'application/xhtml+xml', 'text/javascript', 'text/css'}:
-                            content_type = 'application/octet-stream'  # Forces download
+                        # For security, force renderable/active types (HTML, JS,
+                        # CSS, SVG, XML — anything that can carry inline <script>
+                        # and execute in the page origin) to download instead of
+                        # displaying inline, preventing stored XSS. The
+                        # attachment disposition is the load-bearing guard: a
+                        # bare filename= hint does not force a download per
+                        # RFC 6266, so we only attach it on the dangerous branch
+                        # to avoid breaking inline display of legitimate images.
+                        # Escape backslash/quote per RFC 6266 quoted-string so a
+                        # filename containing a double quote (which passes the
+                        # ".."/leading-slash filter above) can't break out of the
+                        # header's quoted-string and malform the disposition.
+                        safe_filename = filename.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
+                        disposition = f"filename=\"{safe_filename}\""
+                        if folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type(content_type):
+                            content_type = 'application/octet-stream'
+                            disposition = f"attachment; filename=\"{safe_filename}\""
 
                         return web.FileResponse(
                             file,
                             headers={
-                                "Content-Disposition": f"filename=\"{filename}\"",
-                                "Content-Type": content_type
+                                "Content-Disposition": disposition,
+                                "Content-Type": content_type,
+                                "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff"
                             }
                         )
 

tests-unit/assets_test/test_downloads.py

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import contextlib
+import json
 import time
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime
@@ -9,6 +11,40 @@
 from helpers import get_asset_filename, trigger_sync_seed_assets
 
 
+def test_download_svg_forced_to_attachment(http: requests.Session, api_base: str):
+    """GHSA-779p-m5rp-r4h4 CISA-5 (sibling route): an uploaded SVG must never be
+    served inline from GET /api/assets/{id}/content, or an inline <script> runs
+    in the app origin (stored XSS). Even with disposition=inline requested, a
+    dangerous content type must be forced to application/octet-stream +
+    Content-Disposition: attachment + nosniff. Regression guard for the stale
+    inline blocklist that previously omitted image/svg+xml and ignored the
+    centralized folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type check.
+    """
+    svg = b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert(1)</script></svg>'
+    files = {"file": ("evil.svg", svg, "image/svg+xml")}
+    form_data = {
+        "tags": json.dumps(["models", "checkpoints", "unit-tests", "svgxss"]),
+        "name": "evil.svg",
+    }
+    up = http.post(api_base + "/api/assets", files=files, data=form_data, timeout=120)
+    body = up.json()
+    assert up.status_code in (200, 201), body
+    aid = body["id"]
+    try:
+        r = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}/content?disposition=inline", timeout=120)
+        r.content
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        ct = r.headers.get("Content-Type", "").lower()
+        cd = r.headers.get("Content-Disposition", "").lower()
+        assert "svg" not in ct, f"SVG served with a renderable content type: {ct!r}"
+        assert ct.startswith("application/octet-stream"), f"expected octet-stream, got {ct!r}"
+        assert "attachment" in cd, f"inline disposition not overridden to attachment: {cd!r}"
+        assert r.headers.get("X-Content-Type-Options", "").lower() == "nosniff"
+    finally:
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            http.delete(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}", timeout=30)
+
+
 def test_download_attachment_and_inline(http: requests.Session, api_base: str, seeded_asset: dict):
     aid = seeded_asset["id"]
 

tests-unit/comfy_test/folder_path_test.py

@@ -53,8 +53,11 @@ def test_annotated_filepath():
 
 def test_get_annotated_filepath():
     default_dir = "/default/dir"
-    assert folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath("test.txt", default_dir) == os.path.join(default_dir, "test.txt")
-    assert folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath("test.txt [output]") == os.path.join(folder_paths.get_output_directory(), "test.txt")
+    # get_annotated_filepath now normalizes with os.path.abspath (part of the
+    # GHSA-779p traversal hardening), so compare against the normalized form —
+    # on Windows abspath also prepends the current drive letter.
+    assert folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath("test.txt", default_dir) == os.path.abspath(os.path.join(default_dir, "test.txt"))
+    assert folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath("test.txt [output]") == os.path.abspath(os.path.join(folder_paths.get_output_directory(), "test.txt"))
 
 def test_add_model_folder_path_append(clear_folder_paths):
     folder_paths.add_model_folder_path("test_folder", "/default/path", is_default=True)